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ABSTRACT
EPSILON BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION
ERGN, Emre Ergin
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Nuh Aygün Dalkran
July 2014
We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for epsilon-Bayesian Imple-
mentation. Results of Jackson (1991) are extended upon the environments
where the agents has some level of bounded rationality. Yet, his necessity
condition, Bayesian Monotonicity is not nested with our necessity condition,
epsilon-Bayesian Monotonicity.
Keywords: Bayesian Implementation, Epsilon Equilibrium, Bayesian Mono-
tonicity
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ÖZET
EPSLON BAYEZYEN UYGULAMA
ERGN, Emre
Yüksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç Dr. Nuh Aygün Dalkran
Temmuz 2014
Epsilon-Bayezyen Uygulama için gerek ve yeter ko³ullar sunuyoruz. Jackson
(1991)'in sonuçlarn ki³ilerin belli bir seviyede irrasyonelli§i oldu§u durum-
lara geni³letiyoruz. Ancak, onun gerek ko³ulu, Bayezyen Monotonlukla, bizim
gerek ko³ulumuz epsilon-Bayezyen Monotonluk birbirini gerektirmiyor.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Bayezyen uygulama, Epsilon Denge, Bayezyen monoton-
lu§u.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
After society has agreed upon a social choice rule, there is no certain way
to implement that rule correctly, since preferences can only be considered
through announcements. Agents may report their preferences falsely, accord-
ing to a strategy that ensures deﬁned social choice rule beneﬁt them. Our
interest in this topic stems from the casual exposure to authority's decision on
some alternatives in daily life. For example, who will get which teaching as-
sistantship in an eﬃcient way, when the preferences of each graduate student
is unknown? Is there a way to ensure that each student won't manipulate
the found system?
Since we don't want to have unwanted strategy proﬁles as equilibrium,
our work deals with the problem of full implementation. Gibbard (1973)
and Satterthwaite (1975) showed that there can be no strategy-proof game
which is not dictatorial following the work of Arrow (1963). So, after Groves
and Ledyard (1977), Hurwicz (1979), and Schmeidler (1980) which include
constructing nondictatorial game mechanisms in economic environments, im-
plementation literature highly depends on Nash Equilibrium. Maskin(1999)
includes an elegant constructive proof of existence of a mechanism that im-
plements a social choice rule via Nash Equilibrium.
When there is incomplete information, agents must also speculate about
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other agents' true preferences when deciding their own announcement. That
brings forward Bayesian Equilibrium concept. Postlewaite and Schmeidler
(1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) analyzed incomplete information
case in nonexclusive information assumption i.e. with N agents, every group
of N-1 agents collectively has complete information. They found that, only
Bayesian monotonicity will suﬃce for that kind of implementation. Palfrey
and Srivastava (1989) analyzed exclusive information case, and found that a
new condition is necessary for such implementation: Incentive Compatibility,
and a stronger version of it is suﬃcient for full implementation. Jackson
(1991) extends their work, and ﬁnds necessary and suﬃcient conditions with
possibility of externality and noneconomic environments.
In bounded rationality, there is a possibility that agents will not move
according to their best interest. Considering many experimental ﬁndings,
and the general debate on whether Nash Equilibrium is a good representa-
tion on reality, bounded rationality is a rather new, but necessary adding
to the implementation literature. So it is crucial to analyze what happens,
when the agents not strictly achieve to get their best responses, but rather
make a decision that is close to it. Barlo and Dalkiran(2009) extends Maskin
(1999) to analyze bounded rationality case, and showed that there can be im-
plementation with modiﬁed version of monotonicity and limited veto power
(Benoit and Ok, 2006).Barlo and Dalkiran(2014) did a similar extension for
Bergemann and Morris (2008). Common crucial result is that, implementable
Social Choice Correspondences set and epsilon implementable SCC set are not
subset of one another for both extensions. That means, bounded rationality
will have diﬀerent policy implications.
Our paper will provide necessary and suﬃcent conditions for a social choice
set to be implementable via epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium when agents' pref-
erences can be represented by cardinal utilities in incomplete information
environment. That is, we will extend Jackson (1991) to include bounded ra-
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tionality as deﬁned in Radner (1980), just as Barlo and Dalkiran (2009) did
it with Maskin (1999). We will use a constructive proof to show that Social
Choice Functions that provide epsilon-Incentive Compatibility and epsilon-
Bayesian Monotonicity, are epsilon-implementable in economic environments.
In proof, we will construct a general message space and a mechanism which
will ensure epsilon Bayesian implementability under those conditions.Then
our paper includes examples of social choice functions that justiﬁes using
epsilon-Bayesian implementation concept.
Chapter 2 describes the model, Chapter 3 provides our main result, Chap-
ter 4 covers two examples of social choice rules to show that our and Jackson's
conditions are not nested , Chapter 5 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Preliminaries
Below, we represent the notation we use throughout the paper.
• N = {1, 2, ..., n} denotes the set of agents.
• Θi denotes the ﬁnite set of possible types of agent i.
• ε denotes the level of bounded rationality of agents. (ε is state inde-
pendent.)
• Θ = Θ1 × ... × Θn denotes the possible states of the world. (The
knowledge is distributed among the agents.)
• A denotes the set of alternatives which is assumed to be ﬁxed across
states.
• F = {f |f : Θ→ A} denotes the set of all social choice functions.
• F ⊂ F is said to be a social choice set.
• qi(θ) is the probability measure on the set of possible states.
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• pii(θi) = {t ∈ Θ | ti = θi} is the set of states which i believes may be the
true state of the world when his private information is θi.
• Each agent i's state dependent preferences over the set of alternatives
is given by ui : A×Θ→ R+.
Deﬁnition 1 (Mechanism). A mechanism, alternatively a game form, de-
scribes a message/strategy space Mi 6= ∅ for each agent i ∈ N and speciﬁes
an outcome function o : M → A, where M = ×i∈NMi. We denote a normal
form mechanism by µ = (M, o). In state θ, the mechanism µ together with
the preference proﬁle uθ deﬁne a game of incomplete information. In such a
game, a strategy for player i is a function σi : Θi →Mi. A strategy proﬁle is
denoted by σ∗(θ) = ×i∈Nσi(θi).
Below is the deﬁnition of an Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium of a mechanism
µ:
Deﬁnition 2 (Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium). A strategy proﬁle σ∗ is called
an Epsilon-Bayesian equilibrium of µ, if for all i, θi and σ˜i we have
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[o(σ(θ)), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[o(σ˜i(θi), σ−i(θ−i)), θ]− ε
We continue with the deﬁnition of Epsilon-Bayesian Implementation.
Deﬁnition 3 (Epsilon-Bayesian Implementation). F is said to be Epsilon-
Bayesian implementable (in pure strategies) if there exists a mechanism µ =
(M, o) such that:
1. For every f ∈ F , there exists an Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium σ∗ of
µ = (M, o) that satisﬁes
f(θ) = o(σ∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ;
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2. For every Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium σ∗ of µ = (M, o), there exists
f ∈ F such that:
o(σ∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
2.2 The conditions
We list necessary and suﬃcient conditions for Epsilon-Bayesian Implementa-
tion:
Deﬁnition 4 (Closure). Recall that pii(θi) = {t | ti = θi} and the sets pii form
a partition Πi over Θ. Let Π denote the common knowledge concatenation
deﬁned by Π1, ...,ΠN . That is, Π is the ﬁnest partition which is coarser than
each Πi.
Pick any two disjoint events Θˆ and Θ˜ such that Θˆ ∪ Θ˜ = Θ and for any
pi ∈ Π either pi ⊂ Θˆ or pi ⊂ Θ˜. (Thus, Θˆ and Θ˜ are such that, given any state
in Θ, all agents know whether the state lies in Θˆ or Θ˜ and this is common
knowledge among agents.) A social choice set F satisﬁes closure if for any
e ∈ F and f ∈ F there exists h ∈ F such that g(θ) = e(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θˆ and
g(θ) = f(θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ˜.
This is the same condition in Jackson (1991) and was ﬁrst discussed by
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987).
Deﬁnition 5 (Epsilon bounded Incentive Compatibility). A social choice set
F satisﬁes Epsilon bounded Incentive Compatibility (EIC) if for all f ∈ F ,
i, and ti ∈ Θi such that∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f(ti, θ−i), θ]− ε ∀θi ∈ Θ.
One can easily see that when ε = 0, EIC condition will coincide with the
Incentive Compatibility condition in Jackson(1991).
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Deﬁnition 6 (Deception). A deception by agent i ∈ N is denoted by αi :
Θi → Θi. A deception αi by agent i with a true type θi is interpreted as i's
reported type, αi(θi), as a function of his true type. A proﬁle of deceptions
is denoted by α(θ) = (α1(θ1), α2(θ2), ..., αn(θn)). f ◦ α(θ) = f(α(θ)) and
naturally, it deﬁnes of a deception's outcome on a single state.
Deﬁnition 7 (Epsilon-Bayesian Monotonicity). F is said to be Epsilon-
Bayesian Monotonic (EBM) if, for every f ∈ F and deception α with f ◦α /∈
F , there exists i ∈ N, r : Θ−i → A such that
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[r(α−i(θ−i)), θ′] >
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[f ◦ α(θ), θ′] + ε (2.1)
for some θ′i ∈ Θi and
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[r(θ−i), θ]− ε (2.2)
for all θi ∈ Θi
Here i can be interpreted as a whistle-blower and r as a reward: Condition
(1) guarantees that i has (strict) incentive to blow the whistle when the
outcome is incompatible with F and Condition (2) makes sure that if the
outcome is compatible with F , i does not have enough incentive to blow the
whistle.
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CHAPTER 3
MAIN RESULTS
We are working in epsilon-economic environment which is deﬁned below.
The social choice function f/Ψh is deﬁned along set Ψ ⊂ Θ as [f/Ψh(θ)] =
f(θ) ∀θ ∈ Ψ and [f/Ψh(θ)] = h(θ) otherwise.
Notation:
fP εi (θi)f˜ ⇔
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] >
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[f˜(θ), θ] + ε
Deﬁnition 8 (Epsilon-Economic Environment). An environment satisﬁes
(EE) if for any h ∈ F and θ ∈ Θ, there exist i and j (i 6= j) such that
f ∈ F and g ∈ G while f and g are constant, f/ΨhP εi (θi)h and g/ΨhP εj (θj)h
for all Ψ ⊂ Θ with θ ∈ Ψ. Environments satisfying (EE) are said to be
epsilon-economic.
Condition (EE) requires that for any given social choice function and
state, there are at least two agents who have strict incentives (more than ε)
to alter the social choice function. The condition is economic in nature since
it implies that agents can not be simultaneously satiated, thus there is no
ultimate social choice.
Theorem 1. In an environment which satisﬁes (EE), N ≥ 3 a social choice
set F is implementable, if and only if F satisﬁes C,EIC and EBM .
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Proof. Necessity:(⇒)
[Closure:] Let (M, g) implement F . Take any f, f ′ ∈ F such that f 6= f ′.
Suppose Θˆ ∪ Θ˜ = Θ where for any pi ∈ Π we either have pi ∈ Θˆ or pi ∈ Θ˜.1
Consider the corresponding Epsilon Bayesian Equilibria σ∗ and σ′∗ where
f(θ) = g(σ∗(θ)) and f ′(θ) = g(σ′∗(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ. Let σ′′∗(θ) = σ∗(θ) for all
θ ∈ Θˆ and σ′′∗(θ) = σ′∗(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ˜. Then σ′′∗(θ) must be another Epsilon-
Bayesian Equilibrium. Letting f ′′(θ) = f(θ) when θ ∈ Θˆ and f ′′(θ) = f ′(θ)
when θ ∈ Θ˜, we get f ′′(θ) = g(σ′′∗(θ)) hence by (2) of Epsilon-Bayesian
Implementation we must have f ′′ ∈ F which assures Closure.
[EIC:] Take any f ∈ F and the corresponding Epsilon-Bayesian Equilib-
rium σ such that g[σ(θ)] = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Consider any i, ti ∈ Θi and the
strategy σ˜i(θi) = σ(ti) for some ti ∈ Θi. Since σ is an equilibrium we must
have:
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[g(σ(θ)), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[g(σ˜i(θi), σ−i(θ−i)), θ]− ε
Since h[σ(θ)] = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ we have g((σ˜i(θi), σ−i(θ−i)) = g(σ(ti, θ−i)) =
f(ti, θ−i) which establishes (EIC).
[EBM:]Let f and σ be as above. Consider a deception α such that there
is no g ∈ F with g(θ) = f ◦ α(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. We must hence have that
σ ◦α is not an Epsilon-Bayesian-equilibrium. Therefore, there exist i, θi, and
m˜i such that
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[h(m˜i, σ−i ◦ α−i(θ−i)), θ] >
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[h(σ ◦ α(θ)), θ] + ε
Since f(θ) = h(σ(θ)) for all θ ∈ Θ we have g(σ◦α(θ)) = f ◦α(θ). Deﬁning
r(θ−i) := h(m˜i, σ−i(θ−i)) follows (1) of EBM:
1Recall that pii(θi) =
{
t | ti = θi} and the sets pii form a partition Πi over Θ. Let
Πdenote the common knowledge concatenation deﬁned by Π1, ...,ΠN . That is, Π is the
ﬁnest partition which is coarser than each Πi.
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∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[r(α−i(θ−i)), θ] >
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[f ◦ α(θ)), θ] + ε
On the other hand, σ is an Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium implies:
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[h(σ(θ)), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[h(m˜i, σ−i(θ−i)), θ]− ε
Again, since f(θ) = h(σ(θ)) and r(θ−i) = h(m˜i, σ−i(θ−i)) follows (2) of
EBM as well:
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[r(θ−i)), θ]− ε .
Suﬃciency: (⇐)
Let F be a social choice set which satisﬁes closure, EIC and EBM .
Consider the following mechanism:
Deﬁne message space of each agent i as: Mi = Θi×F ×{∅∪F}×N and
M = ×i∈NMi.
That is, each agents sends a 4 dimensional message. The ﬁrst coordinate is
chosen form their type space, the second coordinate is a social choice function
from the social choice set, F , to be implemented, third coordinate can either
be empty or is an (unrestricted) social choice function, F , fourth coordinate
is chosen to be a natural numbers.
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To deﬁne the outcome function we partition M as follows:
M0 = {m ∈M |mj = (., f,∅, k) for all j ∈ N for some f ∈ F and k ∈ N}
M∗i = {m ∈M |mj = (., f,∅, k) for all j 6= i for some f ∈ F
and mi = (., f,∅, l) or mi = (., f ′, ., .)}
M∗∗i = {m ∈M |mj = (., f,∅, k) for all j 6= i and
mi = (., f, f˜ , .) for some f ∈ F}
M∗∗∗ = {m ∈M |m /∈M∗ ∪M∗∗}
where M∗ = ∪iM∗i and M∗∗ = ∪iM∗∗i . Clearly, M = M0 ∪M∗ ∪M∗∗ ∪M∗∗∗.
For any given message proﬁle m let θm = m11 ×m12 × . . .×m1n where m1i
is the ﬁrst coordinate of the message sent by agent i. Consider the outcome
function h : M → A given as below:
• o(m) = f(θm) if m ∈M0 ∪M∗;
• o(m) = f˜(θm) if m ∈M∗∗i and∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f˜(m
1
i , θ−i), θ]− ε for all θi ∈ Θi;
• o(m) = f(θm) if m ∈M∗∗i and∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[o(m
1
i , θ−i), θ] >
∑
θ∈pii(θi)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] + ε for some θi ∈ Θi;
• o(m) = m3i∗(θm) if m ∈ M∗∗∗ where m3i∗ is the social choice func-
tion which is the third coordinate of the message sent by agent i∗ =
argmaxi{m4i }, i.e., i∗ is the agent who has the highest natural number
in his message's fourth coordinate.
Now we will show that µ = (M, g) as deﬁned above implements F in
Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium.
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Lemma 1. For every f ∈ F , there exists an Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium σ∗
of µ such that h(σ(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Take any f ∈ F consider σ∗ such that σ∗i (θi) = (θi, f,∅, ., k) for all
i ∈ N and for some k ∈ N. Hence, by construction of µ we have o[σ(θ)] = f(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ as desired.
To see that σ∗ is an equilibrium consider a deviation σ˜i by agent i. First
observe that we can either have (σ˜i(θi), σ−i(θ−i)) ∈M∗i or (σ˜i(θi), σ−i(θ−i)) ∈
M∗∗i . If (σ˜i(θi), σ−i(θ−i)) ∈ M∗i , that is, σ˜i(θi) = (θ˜i, f,∅, l) or σ˜i(θi) =
(θ˜i, f
′, fˆ , l) then the outcome changes to f(θ˜i, θ−i). It follows from EIC that
such a deviation cannot be proﬁtable more than ε. If (σ˜i(θi), σ−i(θ−i)) ∈M∗∗i ,
then σ˜i(θi) = (θ˜i, f, f˜ , l), then the outcome is either f(θ˜i, θ−i) or f˜(θ˜i, θ−i). In
the case of former again it follows from EIC that such a deviation cannot be
proﬁtable more than ε. For the case of latter, by construction, we must have
∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f˜(θ˜i, θ−i), θ]− ε for all θi ∈ Θi
which means such a deviation is not proﬁtable more than ε as well.
Lemma 2. For every Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium σ∗ of µ = (M,h), there
exists f ∈ F such that h(σ∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Let σ∗ be an Epsilon-Bayesian equilibrium and let α describe the an-
nouncement of the state (m1 as a function of θ) under σ .
Suppose that there does not exist a social choice function f in F which is
equivalent to h(σ). We will ﬁnd a deviating player to prove by contradiction.
Without loss of generality, we can take f = g ◦ α since for any f , there is
some g and α which satisﬁes this. 2
We are interested in ﬁnding a deviating player, so we will look for all cases
whether if there is such deviating player i. Remembering our mechanism, a
2g = f and α being the identity deception is the trivial case.
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message proﬁle m, can belong to four diﬀerent sets, namely, M0,M?i ,M
??
i and
M???.
Case 1 σ∗ ∈M0
A player i can change the outcome by deviating only with choosing his
m˜i =
(
., f, f˜ , .
)
which satisﬁes∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f(θ), θ] ≥
∑
θ∈pii(θ)
qi(θ)ui[f˜(m
1
i , θ−i), θ]− ε for all θi ∈ Θi.
Any other deviation will put the σ˜ into M??i with ,o(m) = f(θ
m) thus pro-
viding no possible deviation.
We know that by EBM, since f = g ◦α /∈ F, there is some i and r satisﬁes
r(α−i(θ−i))P εi (θi)f for some θi ∈ Θi, while gRεi r(θ−i) for all θ′i ∈ Θi. It can
easily be seen that second condition of EBM coincides with the requirement
for o(m) = f˜(θm) in our mechanism. We know that this deviation will be
beneﬁcial for i, because of ﬁrst condition of EBM. So, for this case, i has
proﬁtable deviation.
Case 2 σ∗ ∈M?i ∪M??i
If the starting included a deviation from some player i, then some other
player j could change his message with highest natural number as its fourth
component, contradicting σ∗ being a Epsilon Bayesian Equilibrium. This is
due to environment is epsilon-economic, all agents can not be simultaneously
satiated.
Case 3 σ∗ ∈M???
Since the environment is economic, there is no ultimate social choice. So,
whenever this is the case, some player j can deviate to his ultimate choice
using highest natural number as his fourth component, contradicting σ being
a Epsilon Bayesian Equilibrium.
Therefore, i is better oﬀ by submitting (α(θ), f, r, .) whenever θi is ob-
served.This contradicts that σ is an equilibrium, so our supposition about
nonexistence of a social choice function equivalent to h(σ) is wrong.
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CHAPTER 4
EXAMPLES
This chapter proves that epsilon-Bayesian Monotonicity (henceforth EBM)
and Bayesian Monotonicity (henceforth BM) are not nested. This directly
implies implementable social choice rules with or without bounded rationality
are not nested. Examples are tested with a C++ code, which is included in
the appendix.
4.1 BM does not imply EBM
Following is an example to Bayesian Monotonic social choice rule which is
not epsilon-Bayesian monotonic (result holds for  = 0.75).
Suppose N=1,2,3 and Θi = {0, 1}. Hence a type proﬁle (θ1, θ2, θ3) ∈ Θ =
{0, 1}3. There are 8 possible outcomes given by
A = {0-0-0,0-0-1,0-1-0,0-1-1,1-0-0,1-0-1,1-1-0,1-1-1}
The naming of outcomes implies our preferred social choice rule's outcome
for each situation, assuming perfect honesty. For every type of proﬁle, θ =
(θ1, θ2, θ3), of the society, payoﬀ corresponding to each outcome is given by
the following matrix. Circled entries are our social choice rule, which maps
each state to the eﬃcient fair outcome.
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0− 0− 0 0− 0− 1 0− 1− 0 0− 1− 1 1− 0− 0 1− 0− 1 1− 1− 0 1− 1− 1
0,0,0 1,1,1 1, 1, 0 1, 0, 1 5/4, 0, 0 0, 1, 1 0, 5/4, 0 0, 0, 5/4 0, 0, 0
0,0,1 1, 1, 0 1,1,1 5/4, 0, 0 1, 0, 1 0, 5/4, 0 0, 1, 1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 5/4
0,1,0 1, 0, 1 5/4, 0, 0 1,1,1 1, 1, 0 0, 0, 5/4 0, 0, 0 0, 1, 1 0, 5/4, 0
0,1,1 5/4, 0, 0 1, 0, 1 1, 1, 0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 5/4 0, 5/4, 0 0, 1, 1
1,0,0 0, 1, 1 0, 5/4, 0 0, 0, 5/4 0, 0, 0 1,1,1 1, 1, 0 1, 0, 1 5/4, 0, 0
1,0,1 0, 5/4, 0 0, 1, 1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 5/4 1, 1, 0 1,1,1 5/4, 0, 0 1, 0, 1
1,1,0 0, 0, 5/4 0, 0, 0 0, 1, 1 0, 5/4, 0 1, 0, 1 5/4, 0, 0 1,1,1 1, 1, 0
1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 5/4 0, 5/4, 0 0, 1, 1 5/4, 0, 0 1, 0, 1 1, 1, 0 1,1,1
Table 4.1: Payoﬀ matrix and social choice set for Example 4.1
For deception α(θ) =
 (1, 1, 1) : θ = (1, 1, 1)(0, 0, 0) : otherwise. and with  = 0.75, there
is no i ∈ N and r : Θ−i → A satisfying both conditions of epsilon-Bayesian
Monotonicity for this payoﬀ matrix and social choice rule.
4.2 EBM does not imply BM
This example is constructed upon a similar setup. Again, there are 3 agents,
N={1,2,3} which can be type 0 or type 1, (Θi = {0, 1}). This is Epsilon
Bayesian Monotonic for  = 0.75 but not Bayesian Monotonic.
For every type of proﬁle, θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3), of the society, payoﬀ correspond-
ing to each outcome is given by the following matrix. Circled entries are our
social choice rule, which maps each state to the eﬃcient fair outcome.
For deception α′(θ) =

(0, 0, 1) : θ = (0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 0) : θ = (1, 0, 1)
θ : otherwise.
, there is no i ∈ N and
r : Θ−i → A satisfying both conditions of Bayesian Monotonicity for this
payoﬀ matrix and social choice rule.
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0− 0− 0 0− 0− 1 0− 1− 0 0− 1− 1 1− 0− 0 1− 0− 1 1− 1− 0 1− 1− 1
0,0,0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 17/4, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 17/4, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
0,0,1 0, 0, 0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
0,1,0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
0,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
1,0,0 17/4, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
1,0,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0
1,1,0 0, 0, 17/4 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1,1,1 0, 0, 0
1,1,1 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 17/4 0, 17/4, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 0, 0, 0 1,1,1
Table 4.2: Payoﬀ matrix and social choice set for Example 4.2
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This thesis analyzes full implementation of a social choice rule via epsilon-
Bayesian equilibrium and deﬁnes corresponding conditions, namely Epsilon
bounded Incentive Compatibility (EIC) and Epsilon Bayesian Monotonicity
(EBM). We prove that, together with Closure, these conditions are both
necessary and suﬃcient for full implementation under our assumptions which
includes the environment is epsilon-economic and there are at least three
agents in the society.
Our analysis extends Jackson (1991) to consider bounded rationality, and
gives examples in order to show that Bayesian implementable and epsilon-
Bayesian implementable sets are not nested with each other. Our results show
that full implemenation via Epsilon-Bayesian Equilibrium is possible when the
conditions in Jackson (1991) are modiﬁed considering bounded rationality.
There are two main reasons that makes this valuable. First, as we exem-
plify, there are some social choice sets which are not Bayesian implementable
as deﬁned in Jackson (1991), but nevertheless is implementable via epsilon-
Bayesian implementation. Second, when a social planner takes on a more
behavioral approach, he may ﬁnd epsilon-Bayesian equilibrium more sensible
under bounded rationality hypothesis.
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Possible extensions are analyzing incomplete information case with diﬀer-
ent levels of boundedness for each agent, or dealing with non-economic envi-
ronments.
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APPENDIX
Now, we explain the C++ code we use for checking examples 4.1 and 4.2.
Below are the deﬁnitions of processes and functions.
• fstate function ﬁnds corresponding states for each row in our examples.
• ﬀpos function ﬁnds all possible states for agent i, given his state.
• funa function ﬁnds the result of f ◦ α(θ) for given a social choice rule
f , and a deception α.
• runa function does the similar for a reward function r : Θ−i → A.
• pref1 function checks non-strict preference and also considers degree of
boundedness of rationality. Since we are only checking this for (2.1),
format of f1 and f2 is deﬁned in a way that is compatible to that
condition.
• pref2 function checks strict preference and also considers degree of
boundedness of rationality. Since we are only checking this for (2.2),
format of f1 and f2 is deﬁned in a way that is compatible to that con-
dition.
• halfdec function ﬁnds the deception proﬁle, when agent i tells the truth.
What we will ﬁnd via this function is a mapping from possible states
for agent i, to itself. More formally this gives us α−i(θi) as in (2.1).
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• There are 88 possible deceptions. Because of memory constraints, all
deceptions are deﬁned within-loop. That is diﬀerent for possible reward
functions, since there are only 84 = 4096 possible r. Those functions
are stored in posg array, and called when needed.
• Remaining parts are straightforward, code checks whether there is r :
Θ−i → A, i ∈ N as in Deﬁnition 7, which satisﬁes 2.1 and 2.2.
• Code asks which boundedness level should be used, and which example
to analyze. After taking these inputs, program will print corresponding
whistleblowers, types of agents and reward functions to each deceptions.
If there is a problematic deception, that is with no possible reward
function no matter what type of which player is chosen, the code will
print out that deception and stop checking. If there is not, it will
continue to check until counter hits 16777216 and, this will show that
given payoﬀ matrix is Bayesian monotonic, in the default or the epsilon
bounded sense.
A The Code
Below, we include C++ code which is explained above.
#include <stdio.h>
#include <conio.h>
#include <vector>
#include <iostream>
#include <string.h>
using namespace std;
//states
//0-1-2-3-4-5-6-7
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int Theta[8][3]=
{
{0,0,0},{0,0,1},{0,1,0},{0,1,1},{1,0,0},{1,0,1},{1,1,0},{1,1,1},
};
//4.01
float U1[3][8][8]=
{ {
{1,1,1,5/4,0,0,0,0},
{1,1,5/4,1,0,0,0,0},
{1,5/4,1,1,0,0,0,0},
{5/4,1,1,1,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,1,1,1,5/4},
{0,0,0,0,1,1,5/4,1},
{0,0,0,0,1,5/4,1,1},
{0,0,0,0,5/4,1,1,1}
},
{
{1,1,0,0,1,5/4,0,0},
{1,1,0,0,5/4,1,0,0},
{0,0,1,1,0,0,1,5/4},
{0,0,1,1,0,0,5/4,1},
{1,5/4,0,0,1,1,0,0},
{5/4,1,0,0,1,1,0,0},
{0,0,1,5/4,0,0,1,1},
{0,0,5/4,1,0,0,1,1}
},
{
{1,0,1,0,1,0,5/4,0},
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{0,1,0,1,0,1,0,5/4},
{1,0,1,0,5/4,0,1,0},
{0,1,0,1,0,5/4,0,1},
{1,0,5/4,0,1,0,1,0},
{0,1,0,5/4,0,1,0,1},
{5/4,0,1,0,1,0,1,0},
{0,5/4,0,1,0,1,0,1}
}, };
//4.02
float U2[3][8][8]=
{ {
{1,0,0,17/4,0,0,0,0},
{0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0},
{17/4,0,0,0,1,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0},
{0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1}
},
{
{1,0,0,0,0,17/4,0,0},
{0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0},
{0,0,17/4,0,0,0,0,1}
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},
{
{1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0},
{0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0},
{17/4,0,0,0,0,0,1,0},
{0,17/4,0,0,0,0,0,1}
}, };
//FSTATE------finds the state
--------------------------------------
std::vector<int> fstate(int st)
{
int i;
std::vector<int> state;
state.resize(3);
for ( i = 0; i < 3; i++)
{
state[i] = Theta[st][i];
}
return(state);
}
//FPOS-possible states for calculating pref
----------------------
std::vector<int> ffpos(int tip,int pl)
{
int count=0;
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int k;
std::vector<int> possible;
possible.resize(4);
for ( k = 0; k < 8; k++)
{
std::vector<int> ol=fstate(k);
if (tip==ol[pl])
{
possible[count]=k;
count++;
}
}
return(possible);
}
//Funiona-foalpha
-------------------------------------------------------
std::vector<int> funiona(std::vector<int> f,int dec[8][1])
{
int i;
std::vector<int> y;
y.resize(8);
for ( i = 0; i < 8; i++)
{
y[i] = f[dec[i][0]];
}
return(y);
}
//Guniona-goalpha
-------------------------------------------------------
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std::vector<int> guniona(std::vector<int> g,int dec[4][1])
{
int i;
std::vector<int> y;
y.resize(4);
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
y[i] = g[dec[i][0]];
}
return(y);
}
//Pref1-----R-------------------------------------------------
bool pref1(std::vector<int> pos,std::vector<int> f1,std::vector
<int> f2,float U[3][8][8],int pl,float eps)
{
float out11=U[pl][pos[0]][f1[pos[0]]]+U[pl][pos[1]][f1[
pos[1]]]+U[pl][pos[2]][f1[pos[2]]]+U[pl][pos[3]][f1[
pos[3]]];
float out21=U[pl][pos[0]][f2[0]]+U[pl][pos[1]][f2[1]]+U[
pl][pos[2]][f2[2]]+U[pl][pos[3]][f2[3]];
if (out11>=(out21-4*eps))
{
return(1);
}
else
{
return(0);
}
}
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//Pref2-----P-------------------------------------------------
bool pref2(std::vector<int> pos,std::vector<int> f1,std::vector
<int> f2,float U[3][8][8],int pl,float eps)
{
float out11=U[pl][pos[0]][f1[0]]+U[pl][pos[1]][f1[1]]+U[
pl][pos[2]][f1[2]]+U[pl][pos[3]][f1[3]];
float out21=U[pl][pos[0]][f2[pos[0]]]+U[pl][pos[1]][f2[
pos[1]]]+U[pl][pos[2]][f2[pos[2]]]+U[pl][pos[3]][f2[
pos[3]]];
if (out11>(out21+4*eps))
{
return(1);
}
else
{
return(0);
}
}
//halfdec-------------half deception, one agent is honest
------------------------------------------
std::vector<int> halfdec(int wb,int dec[8][1],std::vector<int>
pos)
{
int halfdec1[4][3];
int i,a,k;
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++)
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{halfdec1[i][0]=fstate(dec[pos[i]][0])[0];
halfdec1[i][1]=fstate(dec[pos[i]][0])[1];
halfdec1[i][2]=fstate(dec[pos[i]][0])[2];
halfdec1[i][wb]=fstate(pos[i])[wb];
}
std::vector<int> y,l;
l.resize(4);
y.resize(4);
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
for ( a = 0; a < 8; a++)
{
if (halfdec1[i][0]==Theta[a][0])
{
if (halfdec1[i][1]==Theta[a][1])
{
if (halfdec1[i][2]==Theta[a][2])
{
l[i]=a;
break;
}
}
}
}
}
for ( i = 0; i < 4; i++)
{
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for ( a = 0; a < 4; a++)
{
if(l[i]==pos[a])
{
y[i]=a;
break;
}
}
}
return(y);
}
//MAIN FUNCTION
int main(void)
{
float eps;
int a1,a2,a3;
int aa;
float U[3][8][8];
cout << "Please choose epsilon- degree of bounded rationality: 
";
cin >> eps;
cout <<"Please choose the example payoff matrix for working on.
 \n 1 for 4.1, 2 for 4.2 :";
cin>> aa;
switch(aa)
{
case 1:
for(a1=0;a1<3;a1++)
{
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for(a2=0;a2<8;a2++)
{
for(a3=0;a3<8;a3++)
{
U[a1][a2][a3]=U1[a1][a2][a3];
}
}
}
break;
case 2:for(a1=0;a1<3;a1++)
{
for(a2=0;a2<8;a2++)
{
for(a3=0;a3<8;a3++)
{
U[a1][a2][a3]=U1[a1][a2][a3];
}
}
}
break;
}
printf(":::Working:::\n\n");
//Definition of F
int i1,i2,i3,i4,i5,i6,i7,i8;
int ff[8][1]={0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7};
//int ff[8][1]={0,0,0,0,0,0,0};
std::vector<int> f;
f.resize(8);
f[0]=ff[0][0];
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f[1]=ff[1][0];
f[2]=ff[2][0];
f[3]=ff[3][0];
f[4]=ff[4][0];
f[5]=ff[5][0];
f[6]=ff[6][0];
f[7]=ff[7][0];
int say=1;
int pog[4][8]=
{
{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7},
{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7},
{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7},
{0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7}
};
int posg[4][4097];
for(i1=0;i1<8;i1++)
{
for(i2=0;i2<8;i2++)
{
for(i3=0;i3<8;i3++)
{
for(i4=0;i4<8;i4++)
{
posg[0][say]=pog[0][i1];
posg[1][say]=pog[1][i2];
posg[2][say]=pog[2][i3];
posg[3][say]=pog[3][i4];
say++;
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}}
}
}
printf("Deception check starts\n\n");
int d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7,d8,wb,sg,ii,iic,k,pl,count,deccount;
deccount=1;
bool p,r;
int wbb[4][1]={0,0,1,2};
int iii[3][1]={0,0,1};
for(d1=0;d1<8;d1++)
{
for(d2=0;d2<8;d2++)
{
for(d3=0;d3<8;d3++)
{
for(d4=0;d4<8;d4++)
{
for(d5=0;d5<8;d5++)
{
for(d6=0;d6<8;d6++)
{
for(d7=0;d7<8;d7++)
{
for(d8=0;d8<8;d8++)
{
int dec[8][1]={d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7,d8};
std::vector<int> funa;
funa=funiona(f,dec);
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count=0;
printf("%d ",deccount);
deccount++;
for(pl=0;pl<4;pl++)
{
wb=wbb[pl][0];
for(sg=0;sg<4097;sg++)
{
std::vector<int> g;
g.resize(4);
g[0]=posg[0][sg];
g[1]=posg[1][sg];
g[2]=posg[2][sg];
g[3]=posg[3][sg];
if((pref1(ffpos(0,wb),f,g,U,wb,eps)==1)&&(pref1(ffpos(1,wb),f,g
,U,wb,eps)==1))
{
for(iic=0;iic<3;iic++)
{
ii=iii[iic][0];
std::vector<int> pos;
pos=ffpos(ii,wb);
std::vector<int> halfdecc;
halfdecc=halfdec(wb,dec,pos);
int halfdeccc[4][1];
halfdeccc[0][0]=halfdecc[0];
halfdeccc[1][0]=halfdecc[1];
halfdeccc[2][0]=halfdecc[2];
halfdeccc[3][0]=halfdecc[3];
34
std::vector<int> gunhalfdec;
gunhalfdec=guniona(g,halfdeccc);
p=pref2(pos,gunhalfdec,funa,U,wb,eps);
if(p==1)
{
count++;
}
if (count>0)
{
break;
}
}
}
if (count>0)
{
printf("-deception: %d ",dec[0][0]+1);
printf("%d ",dec[1][0]+1);
printf("%d ",dec[2][0]+1);
printf("%d ",dec[3][0]+1);
printf("%d ",dec[4][0]+1);
printf("%d ",dec[5][0]+1);
printf("%d ",dec[6][0]+1);
printf("%d ",dec[7][0]+1);
printf("agent: %d ",wb+1);
printf("type: %d ",ii);
printf("reward: %d",g[0]+1);
printf("%d",g[1]+1);
printf("%d",g[2]+1);
printf("%d\n",g[3]+1);
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posg[0][0]=g[0];
posg[1][0]=g[1];
posg[2][0]=g[2];
posg[3][0]=g[3];
wbb[0][0]=wb;
iii[0][0]=ii;
break;
}
}
if (count>0)
{
break;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
if((d1==0)&&(d2==1)&&(d3==2)&&(d4==3)&&(d5==4)&&(d6==5)
&&(d7==6)&&(d8==7))
{
count=1;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
printf("Problematic deception: %d ",d1+1);
printf("%d ",d2+1);
printf("%d ",d3+1);
printf("%d ",d4+1);
36
printf("%d ",d5+1);
printf("%d ",d6+1);
printf("%d ",d7+1);
printf("%d\n",d8+1);
break;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
break;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
break;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
break;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
break;
}
}
if (count==0)
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{break;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
break;
}
}
if (count==0)
{
break;
}
}
getch();
}
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